Legal Justice Theory for Direct Taxes. Some theologians have taught that laws imposing indirect taxes are purely criminal, while laws imposing direct taxes are bound to the virtue of legal justice. But the existence of pure criminal laws is questionable; Moreover, such a theory would be difficult to apply in practice because of the somewhat arbitrary distinction between direct and indirect taxes. Take a look at our moral obligation to pay, apart from the alleged legal obligation. There was a time when I considered paying taxes an immoral act. We paid them because we were legally obliged to do so, not because there was something good about it. But I changed my mind. Criminal Law Theory. According to this, there is no moral obligation to pay the tax, but only to accept the penalty if a penalty is imposed for non-payment.
Later, theologians wrote the theory of criminal law Angelo Carletti di Chivasso (died 1495) and Martin aspilcueta (doctor Navarrus; died 1586). However, it is not at all clear whether these theologians would have applied the theory of criminal law to such an imposition as it exists today. Two fundamental reasons explain the theory: the desire to protect citizens from heavy and unfair taxation, and a somewhat voluntarist legal concept. Among contemporary theologians, there is a growing tendency to deny the existence of pure penal laws. Moreover, Scripture and repeated teachings in the Church seem to require a moral obligation with respect to the payment of taxes themselves, not an obligation that binds only with respect to the acceptance of punishment. In the United States, where income and corporate taxes are the most immediate concern of the majority, are generally fair laws. However, some argue that tax laws do not engage in good conscience for a variety of reasons, such as the fact that much tax revenue is lost due to corruption, tax revenues are often wasted, taxes are levied for inappropriate purposes. However, U.S. tax law seems to be a good example of regulatory rationality (ordinatio rationis). The process of budget estimation, the system of checks and balances between the branches of government, the fact of representative government, the opposition of political parties, and the very popular political platform to reduce taxes, if possible – all these elements show that tax law in the United States is fundamentally reasonable and fair. Just as we can reimburse it to a friend who takes us to the airport by doing something else that benefits them – for example, giving them dinner or helping them move – we can also reimburse our citizens by doing something other than paying our taxes. It is difficult to know if we have done enough.
If we choose not to pay taxes because we believe we have already reimbursed our citizens in other ways, we run the risk of being wrong. So I`m quite comfortable with the idea of this process being used to express in our collective and democratic name what we, as a just and decent society, should pay for and support through state institutions (this is, in my words, the phrase “public interest”). It can also be said that this determines what our “fair share” of tax contributions should be. If we don`t like it, we have a collective and democratic process to change those who make such decisions on our behalf. So I don`t deny that there is such a concept as our “fair share” of taxes. There has been a lot in the press lately about taxes. The data leak from Panamanian law firm Mossack Fonseca confirms my view that taxes are a moral rather than a practical issue – and that fair payment of taxes is a moral duty. Of course, we cannot complain about all forms of tax avoidance. If I can only invest a limited amount, I can choose between a pension contribution or an investment in an Individual Savings Account (ISA). I could make this choice on the assumption that my pension contributions would be reduced by tax: I chose to “avoid” tax on a portion of my income and structured my decisions and actions accordingly.
Is that morally reprehensible? A fair tax, as opposed to fees, licences, assessments, etc., can be defined as a compulsory contribution to the public administration levied in the common interest to cover the costs of performing public functions or levied for regulatory purposes, without reference to special benefits granted to the person making the payment. Theologians generally divide taxes into direct and indirect taxes, but the division is not perfect. A direct tax is immediately imposed on the person himself, although it can be levied on the basis of a person`s property, trade or business (usually all taxes per head). An indirect tax is levied directly on the goods and affects the person only indirectly (customs duties, duties, VAT). It says a lot about the dominance of the neoliberal and individualist mentality in most Western societies that the idea of the tax is often wrapped in a convenient duplicity that portrays it in a negative light – usually focusing on the idea of the “helmsman” – an obscure character who takes your money (to be spent on who knows what). Many people try to minimize the taxes they pay, but why can`t we view paying taxes as a positive moral act – like doing your community a favor or helping an old lady across the street? Third, what about “aggressive” tax avoidance? Now, let`s be clear: no form of tax evasion – no matter how socially reprehensible to some – is illegal. In such an interpretation of tax legislation, there is no legal obligation to pay. And let us also be clear: if the legislation on allowances and deductions is correctly interpreted and applied, these allowances and deductions are not a payment of state money to the citizen (as some media and, unfortunately, some parliamentarians would have us believe): in these circumstances, the state has not made a valid legal claim for: to take more money from the citizen than taxes. If the allowance is valid, it is not the money withheld or returned to the citizen of the state: it was and remains the citizen`s money. Second, the power to collect money from citizens through a tax system to collect money that will be used by the state for these “moral” purposes can only be expressed in legislation.
If parliamentarians do not fully or effectively translate their good intentions into legal language that confers a statutory levy power, there can be no legal obligation to pay taxes. But more than that, however just, decent, moral or noble Parliament`s intentions may be, there can be no residual tax liability as originally conceived solely on the basis of a moral obligation.
